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REDISTRIBUTION OR EDUCATION? 





In an overlapping generations model with two social classes, rich and poor, parents of the 
different social classes vote on two issues: redistributive policies for them and education 
investments for their kids. Public education is the engine for growth through its effect on 
human capital; but it is also the vehicle through which kids born from poor families may 
exchange their positions with kids born from rich families. This is because education reduces 
the probability of the mismatch, i.e. individuals with low talent but coming from rich families 
being placed in jobs which should be reserved to people with high talent (and vice-versa). We 
find a political economy equilibrium of the voting game using probabilistic voting. When the 
poor are more politically influent, the economy is characterized by a higher level of 
education, growth and social mobility than under political regimes supported by the rich; pre-
tax inequality is greater in the first case, but post-tax is lower. 
JEL Code: J62, J24, H10. 
Keywords: social mobility, talents’ mismatch, probabilistic voting. 
 
“... For if the son of a golden or silver parent has an admixture of brass and iron, then nature 
orders a transposition of ranks, and the eye of the ruler must not be pitiful towards the child 
because he has to descend the scale and become a husbandman or artisan, just as there may be 
sons of artisans who having an admixture of gold or silver in them are raised to honour, and 
become guardians or auxiliaries. For an oracle says that when a man of brass or iron guards 
the State, it will be destroyed” [Plato, The Republic - Book III, 414 D, circa 360 BCE; 
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2007. 1 Introduction
In a social race individuals of diﬀerent social classes compete to improve their
economic positions. The outcome of this competition depends on individual
talent, individual and family behavior, and on public policies.
This paper analyzes the eﬀects of two public transfer programs, redis-
tribution and education, on the outcome of a social race between two social
classes, the rich and the poor. In an intergenerational setting we explore
the economic motivations and the political process leading parents to choose
redistributive policies for them and public education programs for their kids.
On the conceptual side, the main contribution of the paper is to draw
attention on the diﬀerent strategic incentives that parents of diﬀerent classes
have in investing on the education of their kids. Education has always
been considered an important input for economic growth especially for its
eﬀect on human capital. Here, we emphasize an additional, essential role
of education: namely, education can increase social mobility. A crucial
mechanism through which this eﬀect can occur is that education reduces
what we call the “mismatch of talents” in society.
Since Plato, a fundamental principle of political philosophy in western
societies has been that, in an ideal social state, the allocation of individuals
in social classes should be made according to talents. High talent individuals
should be assigned to higher job positions and low talent individuals to more
basic jobs and thus lower social classes. However, this perfect match does not
always occur in societies, since social positions are often inherited through
family lines to an extent which is diﬃcult to explain only by factors such as
genetic transmission of talent. This may ﬁrst of all happen because talent
is quite diﬃcult to observe directly. Moreover, family connections, social
relations, neighborhood networks may give more chances to kids from rich
families of being allocated in better job positions, and hence of remaining
rich, than to kids from poor families1. However, we also argue that this
“mismatch of talents” is sensitive to public policies. Our main argument
is that public education may increase the capacity of a society to correctly
recognize the true talent of individuals, to allocate them to the correct social
classes and, consequently, to increase social mobility.
In a model with imperfect information, we show that strategic behaviors
to aﬀect the social race emerge, due to this eﬀect of public education on
the mismatch of talents. The poor prefer high education spending to reduce
the social mismatch and increase exchange mobility, while the rich prefer
low education spending, provided that this will stop exchange mobility by
maintaining a high mismatch of talents. More precisely, the rich trade-oﬀ a
positive eﬀect of education on growth with the (for them) negative eﬀect on
1See e.g. Bowles and Gintis (2002) and the references therein for discussion of the
various factors, genetic and environmental, entering in the causal mechanism of the inter-
generational transmission of economic status.
2social mobility.
These strategic incentives are embedded in a probabilistic voting game,
where the two social classes vote simultaneously over a pure redistributive
taxation programme and a balanced public education budget. The political
economy equilibrium depends on who, amongst the poor and the rich, have
more political inﬂuence. When the poor are more politically inﬂuent, the
economy is characterized by higher spending in education and lower spend-
ing in redistribution with respect to the case in which the two classes have
the same political inﬂuence (neutral case). When instead the rich are more
politically inﬂuent, there is lower spending in redistribution and in education
with respect to the neutral case.
This economy shows an interesting dynamics. When the poor are more
politically inﬂuent, growth and social mobility are larger, pre-tax inequality
is greater, and post-tax inequality is lower than in the case where the rich
are more politically inﬂuent. Interestingly, higher growth is associated with
less mismatch and more mobility. This is due to two eﬀects: ﬁrst, there is an
indirect eﬀect, i.e. a society with fewer mismatches is associated with more
education, which thus induces more human capital and growth. Second,
when the mismatch of talents causes also an eﬃciency cost in production, a
direct eﬀect emerges, and higher growth is associated with fewer mismatches
for any level of average human capital.
This paper introduces a new mechanism that relates class formation,
public education and social mobility. Imperfect information on the “true”
talent of individuals creates the mismatch between people talent and their
allocation in social classes which may be reduced by public education, yet not
by pure redistributive policies. To develop this story we introduce various
new ingredients in the literature.
Firstly, imperfect information is a crucial ingredient to explain the ex-
istence of the mismatch of talents. We consider an overlapping generations
model of human capital formation where, as in various previous studies (e.g.
Becker and Tomes 1979, Loury 1981 and, more recently, B´ enabou 1996), in-
nate ability concurs with family and social backgrounds to determine the
economic attainment of kids in the social race. However, unlike in these
previous contributions, we explicitly model a genetic transmission of talent,
using transition probabilities, which are assumed, together with talent, to
be unobservable.
Secondly, the idea that public education promotes social mobility has
also been considered by various previous literature (see e.g. reviews in Solon
1999, Breen and Jonsson 2005, Checchi 2006). In most of the previous con-
tributions, however, the impact of public education on social mobility is due
to capital market imperfections, which in a world where private education is
possible, may prevent the poor from undertaking the same level of education
investment as the rich (as in e.g. Becker and Tomes 1986, Maoz and Moav
1999, Restuccia and Urrutia 2004). We emphasize a diﬀerent mechanism,
3based on the mismatch of talents, which is independent from capital market
imperfections and from the role of private education. In our paper all ed-
ucation is public and there is no role for capital markets to play. Still, the
level of public education aﬀects social mobility, because it makes it easier
for the “true” talent of individuals to be revealed2. This new mechanism
also crucially diﬀerentiates our contribution from some previous studies that
focused on the eﬀects of the allocation of individuals on social mobility and
growth via technological changes, such as Galor and Tsiddon (1997) and
Hassler and Mora (2000).
Thirdly, our paper builds a probabilistic voting model (see Lindbeck
and Weibull 1987, and Persson and Tabellini 2000) to jointly determine two
public policies, income redistribution and public education. The previous
literature has generally studied these two policies separately3. An exception
is a recent paper by Levy (2005), which however focuses on the generational
conﬂict within the class of poor agents, with young poor preferring public
education and old poor preferring income redistribution. The political equi-
librium then arises from endogenous political coalitions, in which rich agents
collude with either the poor young or the poor old to minimize the size of
the government. In our paper, instead, kids’ preferences are internalized in
parents’ preferences and thus there is no generational conﬂict.
The paper is also closely tied to the idea of social mobility as equality of
opportunity4, and contributes to the recent political economy literature on
equality of opportunity and redistribution. Recent contributions (B´ enabou
and Ok 2001) have in particular emphasized the emergence of a trade-oﬀ
between social mobility and redistribution: in socially mobile communities,
since the poor have more chance of upward mobility, they may be induced
not to support high levels of redistribution. As a result, the level of redis-
tribution arising in a more mobile society is lower than the one arising in
a less mobile society (Alesina and La Ferrara 2005). Other contributions
have emphasized the role of individuals’ perceptions of exchange mobility
(see Piketty 1995). These intuitive relations remain valid in our context.
However, they treat mobility as exogenous to the political process, while we
2This is also relevant to study societies both quite immobile and, yet, where the system
of private education is very limited (see e.g. Checchi, Ichino, Rustichini 1999, for the
typical case of Italy).
3See Bodway and Keen (2000) and Harns and Zink (2003) for recent surveys of the
traditional political economy literature on redistributive taxation and the more recent
contributions on public education as a form of in kind redistribution (from rich to poor
in Glomm and Ravikumar 1998, from poor to rich in Fern´ andez and Rogerson 1995, from
old to young in Poterba 1998, Gradstein and Kaganovich 2004).
4See Shorrocks (1978) and Atkinson (1981) for classical papers on the connections
between social mobility and various notions of equality of opportunity, Roemer (1998) for
an interpretation which emphasizes the distinction between equality of “outcomes” and
equality of “opportunity”, Fields and Ok (1999) for a review of the literature on social
mobility measurement
4emphasize that the determination of both redistribution and social mobil-
ity crucially depends on the political competition between diﬀerent social
classes. As a consequence, in our paper, redistribution, education, talents’
mismatch, and social mobility are all endogenously determined in a process
of democratic decision.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the general fea-
tures of the overlapping generations model. Section 3 explains the political
institution governing the social race and provides the results on the political
economy equilibrium of the voting game between the social classes. Section
4 studies the dynamics of the system. Section 5 considers additional eﬃ-
ciency costs of the talents mismatch. Section 6 concludes suggesting how
the framework of the paper can be extended in various directions of future
analyses. All proofs are in the appendix.
2 The setting of the race
In this section, we introduce an overlapping generations economy made up
of a continuum of dynasties i, with unit measure i = [0;1]. Individuals are
heterogenous in their innate talent, which can be high or low. They live
for two periods: in the ﬁrst period young individuals accumulate human
capital building on their innate talent; in the second period adult individuals
receive an income, which depends on the social class they have been allocated
to and take voting decisions. Each adult person becomes a parent and
gives birth to one kid. He dies at the end of the second period. Notice
that in this environment individuals take no economic, but only political
decisions. In fact, individuals’ human capital accumulation and allocation
into social classes depends mainly on the level of public education, which
is determined in the political environment. Moreover, there is imperfect
information, since the innate talent is unobservable, even to each individual,
and cannot be inferred from the economic outcome. In this section we
present the fundamental features of the economic setting, while Section 3
describes the political decision.
2.1 Individuals and social classes
In every period, the society is divided into two social classes of equal size.
Social classes correspond to job’s types and hence incomes. Rich individuals
of dynasty i have a high-paid job and they receive income yt,i = yR
t , while
poor individuals have a low-paid job and receive income yt,i = yP
t , where
the subscript index t with t = 0,1,2,... identiﬁes individuals born at time
t, the subscript index i identiﬁes the speciﬁc dynasty i and the superscript
index R or P identiﬁes the social class, rich or poor. Incomes and social
classes will be endogenously determined (see Section 2.4). All parents are
employed and there is no ﬂexibility in the amount of working hours.
5The process of class transition from parents of generation t to parents of





t   pt+1 1 −   pt+1
yR
t 1 −   pt+1   pt+1
(1)
where   pt+1 ∈ [0,1] is the fraction of parents and kids who belong to the same
social class, and (1−  pt+1) is the fraction of those belonging to diﬀerent social
classes.
2.2 Preferences and public policies
We assume that only parents take political decisions. Hence, only parents’
preferences will matter. Parents experience a warm-glow in ensuring their
kids with an adequate level of human capital to start their second period of
life (Glomm and Ravikumar 1992)5. Mainly, parents value Ct,i in the second
period of their life and their kids’ level of human capital ht+1,i according to
the following Cobb-Douglas utility function:
V (Ct,i,ht+1,i) = ln(Ct,i) + Et,i ln(ht+1,i) (2)
where Et,i is the expectation operator for a parent’s belief about his kid
talent. We explain how these beliefs are formed in Section 2.6.
There are no capital markets. Government imposes a proportional tax
rate τt on income. Per-head tax proceeds at all times t = 0,1,2,... are
given by τtyt, with yt = 0.5yP
t + 0.5yR
t being the average gross income
at time t. Tax proceeds can either ﬁnance a pure redistributive program
or public education: let γt ∈ [0,1] be the fraction of tax proceeds going
into redistribution and (1 − γt) into education. The redistributive program
provides a lump-sum transfer bt to parents of generation t; public education
ﬁnances a per-head amount et of education spending that will enter the
human capital of each young individual of generation t+1 (kids), as speciﬁed
below. All education is public and the overall government budget is balanced
at every period t, so that bt = γtτtyt and et = (1 − γt)τtyt.
Net resources available for the second period consumption of each parent
of generation t are thus Ct,i = yt,i(1 − τt) + bt.
2.3 Human capitals and innate talent
Individuals form their human capital ht,i in the ﬁrst period of life. A funda-
mental variable is innate ability or talent. Innate talent is a random shock
hitting all individuals at the moment of their birth. For each individual i it
can take a low value AL, or a high value AH. For the generation born at time
5See also Galor and Zeira (1993), B´ enabou (2000), Cremer and Pestieau (2004).
6t = 0, we assume that the two values, AL and AH, have equal probability.
Starting with generation t = 1, we assume a genetic mechanism of talent
transmission, which follows a simple Markov process: with probability p an
individual i has the same talent of his parent and with probability 1 − p he
has the opposite talent. The law of large number holds, so that at all t half
individuals are born with AL and half with AH.
Individuals form their human capitals according to a Cobb-Douglas
learning technology, which builds on the average level of knowledge reached
by the society in the previous generation (i.e. the existing stock of human
capital), transmitted to the new born individuals through education. For-
mally, for any individual i of generation t + 1 and innate talent Aj (where





where Ht is the average human capital at time t; et is the per-head level of
public education decided by parents at time t for their kids; and ξ and δ are
the parameters of the Cobb-Douglas, with both δ and ξ ∈ (0,1).
Notice that at time t = 0 society starts with no parents, thus the human
capital accumulation for a young person with talent Aj is some primitive
knowledge k0 directly available to all individuals6.
This process of human capital formation guarantees that at all t =





tAL for all individuals with talent AL (hL





tAH for all individuals with AH (hH
0 = k0AH at t = 0). Fur-
ther, since at all t half individuals born with AL and half with AH, both
categories count for half of the population.
2.4 Imperfect information and social mismatch
An important feature of our setting is that we explicitly model the genetic
transmission of talent, through the probability p. In this way we make
explicit the possibility of an “objective” mechanism of genetic talent trans-
mission. We assume, however, that the genetic probability p of talent trans-
mission is not generally known. Several authors have provided estimates
that innate ability of a child is positively correlated with innate ability of
6Equation (3) is conceptually in line with the literature, in particular with the seminal
work of Becker and Tomes (1979) and Loury (1981). These papers focus on human capital
investment and innate ability as major sources of intergenerational earnings persistence.
This idea is combined with a Cobb-Dogulas learning technology as in Glomm and Raviku-
mar (1992). However, diﬀerently from them, we include random ability, while neglecting
kids’ eﬀort in the process of formation of human capital. Similar, more recent, contribu-
tions include B´ enabou (1996), Fern´ andez and Rogerson (1998), Davies, Zhang and Zeng
(2005).
7the parent (see Bowles and Gintis 2002, Sacerdote 2002, Plug and Vijver-
berg 2003, and references therein), which implies that p lies in some range
of (0.5,1). A complete agreement on the precise value of p is however far
from having being reached. This is because talent is very diﬃcult to observe,
even by the individuals themselves. Thus, we have an imperfect information
context7.
If talents were perfectly observed, given the process of formation of hu-
man capital at equation (3) at all t = 0,1,2,..., it would be natural to assign
high human capital individuals to high-paid jobs and viceversa. Assume for
example that all jobs are paid according to the individual productivity mea-
sured by human capital. Thus, high human capital individuals would be
rich, receiving income yR
t = hH
t , and low human capital individuals would
be poor with income yP
t = hL
t . In this case the probability of class persistence
of matrix (1) would always correspond to the probability of genetic talent
transmission, that is   pt+1 = p. However, given imperfect information, this
allocation process is unfeasible. In particular, social classes will be formed
with some fundamental mismatch, i.e. people with high and low talents are
mixed up in both classes of “poor” and “rich”8.
Precisely, we assume that at any time each social class contains a fraction
αt of individuals allocated in the “correct” social class (low talented people
in the class of poor, and high talented people in the class of rich) and a
fraction (1 − αt) of individuals allocated in the “wrong” social class. Thus,
(1−αt) represents the “mismatch of talents”. Formally, this means that for


















7In particular, the hypothesis of imperfect information implies that talent cannot be
observed either directly through the individual’s human capital, or even indirectly through
the individual’s productivity. Suppose, for example, that each individual i of generation
t + 1 produces an output qt+1,i according to the production function:
qt+1,i = ht+1,i + εt+1,i (4)
where ht+1,i is the human capital of the individual, and εt+1,i is an unobservable random
shock in production (with E(εt+1,i) = 0). Since there are only two types of human capitals,
an individual with talent A




H +εt+1,i; while an individual
with talent A




L +εt+1,i. Thus, equation (4) implies that if
talent cannot be directly recognized from human capital, given the white noise εt+1,i, it
cannot either be perfectly known from qt+1,i.
8Other papers have studied the role of imperfect information on innate talent (e.g.
Maoz and Moav 1999, Checchi, Ichino and Rustichini 1999). In these studies, however,
uncertainty is completely resolved with the acquisition of education (for at least those
individuals who acquire it). In our paper, instead, some uncertainty about innate talent
remains even after education causing the mismatch.
8For individuals born at t = 0, the two incomes are: yP
0 = α0k0AL + (1 −
α0)k0AH and yR
0 = α0k0AH + (1 − α0)k0AL.
Fig. 1 shows how the mismatch between people talent and social classes
can arise in society9. Each individual is assigned to a social class according
to an allocation mechanism which, for all t = 1,..., is based on two simple
rules10: i) a low talent kid with poor parents is always assigned to the
class of poor and a high talent kid with rich parents to the class of rich;
ii) a high talent kid with poor parents is assigned with probability αt+1
to the class of rich and with probability (1 − αt+1) to the class of poor,
and a low talent kid with rich parents is assigned with probability αt+1 to
the class of poor and with probability (1 − αt+1) to the class of rich. In
other words, αt+1 is the probability that the society correctly recognizes the
talents of individuals who should be assigned to a diﬀerent class than their
parents’; while (1 − αt+1) is the probability of having mistakes or errors in
the allocation of these individuals.
This process of class formation suggests that, while in general there are
little problems in putting both poor kids with low talent in the lower class
and rich kids with high talent in the upper class11, it is more diﬃcult to
upgrade kids with high talents from poor parents and to downgrade kids
from rich parents but with low talent12.
The process of class formation hence depends crucially on the proba-
bility αt+1. In the next section we will assume that αt is endogenously
determined based on the level of public education in the society, and we will
discuss various factors which may aﬀect αt+1. Thus, social classes will also
be endogenously determined. Notice now that αt+1 enters both the deter-
mination of the fraction αt+1 of people with the correct talent in each social
class and the probability of class persistence   pt+1 in society. Iterating from
the example of Fig. 1 with t = 1, the precise proportion αt+1 follows this
9From equations (5) and (6) also notice that an incentive compatibility constraint in




t+1, i.e. that αt+1 > 0.5. In the next section we give the
condition for this constraint to be satisﬁed.
10For the ﬁrst generation born at t = 0 the fractions α0 and (1−α0) of people allocated
respectively in the right and in the wrong social classes are determined randomly, with α0
representing the initial condition of the system.
11Still, the setting can be easily generalized to include random errors even for the allo-
cation of low-talented kids born from poor parents and high-talented kids born from rich
parents.
12Given that social classes correspond to jobs’ types, the allocation process of individuals
in social classes may replicate quite realistic stories. For example, kids of a rich family
have better opportunities to ﬁnd an initial better-paid job (say, a stage), independently
on their talent, because of family background, social connections, neighborhood networks
etc. Their on-the-job performance may then reveal the true talent of this person. If he
has a high talent, it is reasonable that he will keep the job, while if he has a low talent,
with probability αt+1 he is recognized and he has to quit. Instead, the kids of a poor
family are on their own. Low talent kids will mainly ﬁnd a low-paid job. Yet, if they have
high talent, with (the same) probability αt+1, they may be recognized and upgraded to
high-paid jobs.
9Figure 1: The formation of social classes with the mismatch of talents
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αt+1 = 1 + [αt(2p − 1) − p](1 − αt+1) (7)
Similarly, in the society the probability of class persistence   pt+1 for kids
of poor parents to remain poor and for kids of rich parents to remain rich
evolves according to the following equation (see dotted lines in Fig. 1):
  pt+1 = 1 − αt+1(αt(1 − 2p) + p) (8)
The latter equation shows that   pt+1 is equal to p only when both αt+1
and αt are 1; while   pt+1 > p whenever either αt+1 or αt (or both) are less
than 1. Thus, when imperfect information generates a mismatch of talents,
class persistence is greater than what should be justiﬁed by the genetic
probability of talent transmission.
102.5 Education and class transitions
In this section we argue that the probability αt+1 of correctly recognizing
individuals’ talents is aﬀected by the level of public education. A society
with a higher level of education is more able to correctly allocate individ-
uals in their appropriate job or social class. In particular, although fam-
ily background, social connections, neighborhood networks and all similar
factors still remain at the origin of the social mismatch illustrated in Fig.
1, education better allows the society to disentangle the impact of family
background from innative talent. Education thus increases the equality of
opportunity, as explained by several studies (see e.g. Checchi 2006, and
references therein). Yet, the ability of the society to separate these two ef-
fects, family background and innate talent, may be reduced by the size of
the group of individuals (low talent kids from rich parents and high talent
kids from poor parents) who has to be evaluated.
Formally, we assume the following relation:
αt+1 =
1 − c + det
yt
(1 − αt)p + αt(1 − p)
(9)
where 1 − c represents the general degree of openness in society, that is
the extent to which society oﬀers equal chances to all individuals indepen-
dently of the level of public education; the parameter d is the degree to
which openness responds to the per-head education expenditure13; and the
denominator expresses for each social class the number of kids at time t+1
who, if correctly allocated according to their talent, should change their so-
cial position with respect to that of their parents. Equation (9) assumes
that the capacity of education of increasing the correct allocation of talents
is lower the higher the number of people who should change their social class
with respect to that of their parents. This is because the signaling of talents
through education works better in a small group.
We generally expect c greater than 0.5 (and lower than 1) and d ∈
(0,0.5). We also assume that the following condition is satisﬁed:
c − d ≥ p. (10)
Condition (10) in particular guarantees that αt+1 is a genuine probability
belonging to the interval (0,1) at all t. Speciﬁcally, when et
yt = 0 and c = 1,
society is completely closed and immobile (αt+1 = 0 and   pt+1 = 1; see
equation 8); when instead et
yt = 1 and c−d = p, the numerator of (9) reaches
its maximum value 1−p, which is also the lower bound of the denominator,
when in particular αt = 1.
13Also notice that although in this paper we only consider the eﬀect of public educa-
tion on the mismatch of talents and mobility, expression (9) can be easily extended to
include the impact of other factors and public policies, amongst which health, security, or
liberalization policies.
11More speciﬁcally, using equation (9), both the proportion of individuals
correctly allocated in the society αt+1 (equation 7) and the probability of
class persistence   pt+1 (equation 8), can be recomputed as follows:
αt+1 = 2 − (c − d
et
yt
) − p + αt(2p − 1) (11)
and




Equations (11) and (12) deserve some comments. Equation (11) de-
scribes how the mismatch evolves in the society at any time t > 0 (starting
from some initial condition α0). It also shows that condition (10) is neces-
sary and suﬃcient for αt+1 ∈ [0.5,1] at all t, that is for society to respect the
incentive compatibility constraint yP
t+1 < yR
t+1 at all t = 0,1,2,... (see foot-
note 9). Furthermore, it is worthwhile noticing that, for some time-invariant
et
yt ∈ [0,1], equation (11) implies a unique steady state αv, obtained as:
αv =




The latter entails αv = 1, namely that society can end-up in a state
without mismatch, if and only if c − d = p and et
yt = 1.14
Equation (12) is crucial in what follows: it makes clear that public edu-
cation increases exchange mobility, by reducing the mismatch of talents. It
also shows that while in our model ability may be genetically transmitted,
the genetic probability p of talent transmission plays no role in the mecha-
nism of inheritance of economic inequality15. Moreover, in the present world
of imperfect information, it represents the only relationships that individuals
can observe, as explained in the following section.
2.6 Individuals’ information set
Remember that, according to their preferences at equation (2), parents care
about their kids’ human capital and hence about the position that their kids
will have in the society. Although parents do not observe their kids’ talents
nor the genetic probability p of talent transmission, they have information
on the ex-post realizations of   pt and et. In other words, although individuals
do not know all the process leading to equation (12), they may use it to form
beliefs about the likelihoods that their kids will go ahead in society.
14Convergence is monotonic with an increasing trajectory if αv > α0 and a decreasing
trajectory if α0 > αv.
15This result is indeed consistent with various empirical evidence (see e.g. Bowles and
Gintis 2002, in particular their section on “the role of genetic inheritance of cognitive
skill”, pp. 10-13).
12In particular, a poor parent will assign probability   pt+1, as deﬁned in




tAL, and will assign probability (1 −   pt+1) that he will
be recognized to have high human capital et
ξH
δ
tAH; the converse holds for
the rich. Using this hypothesis in equation (2), the utility functions for the
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These equations show two critical eﬀects of education: on the one side, it
increases human capital accumulation for all individuals, and hence growth;
on the other side, it introduces a strategic dimension in the social race. In
fact, the poor have an incentive to prefer more public education to increase
the chance for their kids to have a recognized high talent and become rich,
while the rich have the opposite incentive to reduce public education to avoid
that kids with poor parents will have recognized a high talent and take the
good jobs at their place. In the remaining of the paper we will show how this
strategic dimension of public education can aﬀect substantially the political
behavior of the two social classes and its consequences for the macroeconomy.
3 The political institution
At time t, based on their preferences at equations (14) and (15), poor and
rich parents vote on both the overall tax rate τt and on the fraction γt of tax
proceeds going into pure redistribution bt = γtτtyt (with the fraction (1−γt)
ﬁnancing the per-head public education expenditure et = (1 − γt)τtyt).
In this section we introduce a probabilistic voting model to determine
the equilibrium levels of τt and γt. These will determine the GDP shares
going into redistribution and public education, i.e. the ratios bt
yt = γtτt and
et
yt = (1−γt)τt, respectively. In Section 4 we will analyze the dynamics of the
model and the evolution of incomes growth, inequality and social mobility.
3.1 The political economy equilibrium
In the political economy literature, models of probabilistic voting (in the
tradition of Lindbeck and Weibull 1987, building in turn on Coughlin and
Nitzan 1981a and 1981b), are used to solve for political equilibria in situa-
tions in which political platforms include more than one issue16.
16See Persson and Tabellini (2000) for alternative solutions to political economy models
involving multiple issues. Probabilistic voting is particularly appropriate in our context,
because it allows dealing with “ideological” components, which will diﬀerentiate the po-
litical inﬂuence of the two competing social classes, rich and poor.
13Consider two parties, or candidates. Before the election takes place, the
parties commit to a policy platform. They act simultaneously and do not
cooperate. Each party chooses the platform which maximizes its expected
number of votes, or, equivalently, the probability of winning the election.
Platforms are chosen when the election outcome is still uncertain. The two
parties diﬀer along some other dimension relevant to the voters than the
announced policies, unrelated to the policies at issue, and which may reﬂect
ideological elements. Ideology may also twist voters’ preferences away from
strict economic interest. In particular, when there is an ideological twist,
it pays candidates to propose policy mix more attractive to more mobile
voters, also called the “swing” voters17.
As a general result of probabilistic voting models, there is a unique po-
litical equilibrium in which the two candidates propose the same policy.
This policy maximizes a social welfare function weighting all voters’ utility,
with weights depending on the size of the “swing” voters in each class. If
the number of swing voters is the same, all groups get equal weight in the
candidate’s decision, which turns out to be maximizing the average voters’
utility. However, if the groups diﬀer in how easily their votes can be swayed,
the group containing more swing voters is more responsive to policy and gets
a higher weight in the party’s objective.
In our set-up, there are only two classes, the poor and the rich, with
utility functions given in equations (14) and (15), respectively. Let ωt ∈
(0,+∞) denote the weight measuring the proportion of “swing” voters in
the class of “rich” relative to the proportion of “swing” voters in the class
of “poor”.
Deﬁnition. A probabilistic voting equilibrium at time t is a pair (τt,γt)
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where: i) ωt > 0; ii) Ci
t = yi
t(1 − τt) + γtτtyt for i = R,P; iii)
  pt+1 = c − d   et
yt, with et = (1 − γt)τtyt and yt = 0.5(yP
t +yR
t ); iv) and with
yP
t , yR
t , Ht all given at time t.
Given the deﬁnition, when ωt ∈ (0,1) the bias due to “swing” voters is
in favor of the policy mix preferred by the rich; when ωt ∈ (1,+∞) the bias
is in favor of the policy mix preferred by the poor; while when it is exactly
ωt = 1, there is no ideological bias and all preferences count equally.
17“Swing” voters are more ideologically “neutral” individuals, whose vote can be more
easily swayed by a policy change in their favor.
14The following proposition characterizes the political economy equilib-
rium under these three diﬀerent political conditions.
Proposition 1 In the above economy, depending on ωt, the political equi-
libria are as follow:
• For ωt = 1 (all voters count equally), τt = 1 and γt = 1
1+ξ. Hence, the
GDP shares going into pure redistribution and into public education
are, in the order: τtγt = 1
1+ξ and τt(1 − γt) =
ξ
1+ξ at all t = 0,1,2,...;
• For ωt > 1 (bias favors poor), τt = 1 and γt < 1
1+ξ for all t = 0,1,2,....
Hence, the GDP shares are: τtγt < 1
1+ξ and τt(1 − γt) >
ξ
1+ξ at all
t = 0,1,2,...; further, for a time-invariant ωt (that is, constant for all
t = 0,1,2,...), γt is time-invariant, so that the two shares are also
time-invariant;
• For ωt < 1 (bias favors rich), τt and γt are elaborate functions of
the parameters (their exact values are given in Appendix); the more
interesting GDP shares are: γtτt < 1
1+ξ all t = 0,1,2,... with γtτt = 0














,1) ; (1−γt)τt <
ξ
1+ξ at all t = 0,1,2,...; further, for a time-invariant ωt, (1 − γt)τt is
time-invariant.
Moreover, the shares of GDP going into redistribution γtτt and into public
expenditure τt(1−γt), as functions of the various parameters of the political
decision problem are characterized as depicted in Fig. 2, which is integral
part of the Proposition.
The Proposition delivers the political economy equilibrium, as illustrated
in Fig. 2. When ω = 1 there is no political bias towards any of the two
social classes and the policy maker optimally chooses between education
and redistribution ignoring any eﬀect of education on social mobility. This is
because a neutral policy maker is not interested in “who is who” in the social
parade, i.e. he is utilitarian. Thus, he maximizes the objective function
imposing the maximum tax rate (τ = 1) and equalizes the marginal utility
of all individuals18.
When ω  = 1 and education has a positive impact on exchange mobil-
ity (d > 0), the share of GDP going into public education increases with













H). Its maximization then requires to equalize
the marginal utilities of all individuals: rich and poor parents, high and low talent’s kids.
To do this, the policy maker divides the revenues collected so that the marginal beneﬁt
of one more unit of taxes spent for consumption today, that is
1
γ, equals the marginal
beneﬁt of one more unit of taxes spent for education tomorrow,
ξ
1−γ. Solving for γ, we
have γ =
1






















Figure 2: Political equilibrium for education and redistribution
ω ∈ (0,+∞), meaning that when the poor have more political inﬂuence,
education spending is larger than when the two social classes have equal
inﬂuence, which in turn is larger than the case in which the rich have more
political inﬂuence. Redistribution instead is zero if the rich have a very high





); it turns positive and increases with ω when
the rich trade-oﬀ more redistribution with less education, in their attempt
to stop social mobility; and then decreases with ω when the poor have more
political inﬂuence, since they prefer to increase education.
If instead education would play no role on exchange mobility (d = 0,
dotted lines in the ﬁgure), the incentive eﬀects driven by social mobility, that
induce the poor to prefer more education and the rich less, would obviously
disappear, and education would not depend on ω. Interestingly, in this case,
a government under the political inﬂuence of the rich would reduce the level
of redistribution with respect to the case when d > 0. This is because,
with the same tax revenues, the rich prefer now to spend more for public
education and less for redistribution, since the eﬀect of public education that
they dislike has disappeared. On the other hand, redistribution would be
maximum for ω ≥ 1, because when the poor have more political inﬂuence,
they have no incentive to choose less redistribution in exchange of more
education and mobility.
Notice also that, for time-invariant ωt, the equilibrium GDP share go-
ing into public education does not depend on time. This follows from the
property of the Cobb-Douglas utility function and from the fact that both
the rich and poor would in any case put a positive amount of resources
16in public education, for its positive eﬀects on human capital. This impor-
tant property of the equilibrium policy will be useful in the next section on
the dynamics. Conversely, when the rich have more political inﬂuence and












in particular it increases when there is more pre-tax inequality, even for a
constant ωt.
In the conclusions we will consider some possible extensions of the setting
underlying Proposition 1, among which private education, the eﬀects of
diﬀerent parents’ beliefs about their kids’ talents, and distortionary taxation.
4 The dynamics of the economy
This section compares the dynamics of all major endogenous variables of the
system, for political regimes parametrized by the same ωt of Proposition 1.
We focus on economic growth, measured by the changes in per-capita income
yt+1 = 0.5yP
t+1 + 0.5yR
t+1; pre-tax inequality, measured by the diﬀerence
between the two gross incomes19 It+1 = (yR
t+1 − yP
t+1); and social mobility,
measured by (1 −   pt+1). We also look at the evolution of the mismatch in
society, as parametrized by the dynamics of αt+1.
We study the dynamics of the system for the three time-invariant polit-
ical conditions of ωt: ωN = 1 when rich and poor have the same political
inﬂuence (neutral regime), ωP > 1, when the political bias favors the poor,
and ωR < 1 when the bias favors the rich. To identify the various macroe-
conomic variables under the three conditions, we will use the capital index
J = N,P,R in the obvious way20.
4.1 Growth
In this economy the average income, yt+1 = 0.5et
ξH
δ
t(AL + AH), is equal
to average human capital in society, yt+1 = Ht+1. Thus, by substitution we
obtain the following dynamics equation for average income21:
yt+1 = 0.5et
ξyδ
t(AL + AH) (17)
Using now the results of Proposition 1, we can establish the following
implications for economic growth under the three regimes J = N,P,R.
19Since in our economy for all t half of the population is poor and half is rich, the only
source of inequality is given by the diﬀerence of the two levels of incomes.
20This new index only applies to macroeconomic variables: for example, average income
is y
N
t+1 when ω = ω
N, y
P
t+1 when ω = ω
P, and y
R
t+1 when ω = ω
R. Since we do not need
to identify micro variables, such as individual income, under diﬀerent political regimes,




t+1 to indicate the income of the two social classes, poor
and rich respectively, independently of the political regime.
21Notice that yt+1 does not depend on αt+1, i.e. the mismatch does not aﬀect growth.
In a diﬀerent speciﬁcation in Section 5 we will include the cost of the mismatch.
17Proposition 2 . Given a ﬁxed initial condition for the average income
y0 = 0.5k0(AL + AH) equal for all J = N,P,R, and given time-invariant




where BJ = 0.5(AL + AH)[(1 − γJ)τJ]ξ, constant under all J, and with
BP > BN > BR. Thus, yP
t+1 > yN
t+1 > yR
t+1 for all t = 0,1,2,....
Equation (18) is virtually identical to that studied by Glomm and
Ravikumar (1992)22. Growth depends on the sum ξ + δ. We can distin-
guish three cases under which comparing the diﬀerent political regimes (see
Fig. 3): a) if ξ + δ < 1, under all political conditions there are unique,
globally stable, steady states with yP
s > yN
s > yR
s > 0. Notice also that
in this case limt→∞ yJ
t+1/yJ
t = 1 for all J; b) if ξ + δ = 1, there is no
steady state under the regime J = N,P,R for which BJ  = 1. In this case
yJ
t+1/yJ
t = BJ; c) if ξ+δ > 1, under all political conditions there are unique
unstable steady states with yR
s > yN
s > yP





t increases over time if y0 > yJ
s.23
Thus, as in Glomm and Ravikumar (1992), education busts growth
through its impact on human capital, so that economic growth is higher
when education is higher. However, since the strategic eﬀect of education
on social mobility induces the poor to support education more than the rich,
political regimes supported by the poor are also more eﬀective to sustain
economic growth. In fact, in case a) the long-run growth rates are zero un-
der all political regimes, while in cases b) and c) the highest long-run growth
rate is when the poor have more political inﬂuence, followed by the neutral
case and then by the situation in which the rich have more inﬂuence.
4.2 Inequality








we know to be positive as long as condition (10) is satisﬁed and αt+1 ∈












t )ξ(2αt+1 − 1)(AH − AL) (19)
22This is not surprising, given that we have adopted their Cobb-Douglas model of capital
formation. Notice, however, that Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) compare economic growth
in a public versus a private education system, while we compare within a public education
system the consequences on growth of the diﬀerent political conditions.
23In particular, this is the case in which the economy gets unbounded growth under
regime J; otherwise the economy may also end up in the trivial steady-state in which
income is zero. (This trivial steady-state applies to all cases a), b) and c) under all
regimes J = N,P,R; see Fig. 3).




























































































19For all t, the greater is the mismatch, the lower is inequality24. Intu-
itively, more mismatch implies a lower income for the rich (reduced by the
presence of low talented people in their class) and a higher income for the
poor (increased by the presence of high talented people in their class)25.
Therefore, the evolution of inequality depends on the dynamic of the mis-
match under the three political regimes.
Proposition 3 . Given time-invariant ωJ under political regimes J =
N,P,R, the fractions of people with the “right” talent in each class converge
to values of steady state given by αN
v , αP
v , αR




0.5. Further, given some initial condition α0 ∈ [0.5,1] under all regimes, it
is also 1 ≥ αP
t+1 > αN
t+1 > αR
t+1 ≥ 0.5 for all t = 0,1,2,....
Since the rich are those who mostly (only) beneﬁt from the mismatch,
when they have more political inﬂuence, the mismatch is comparatively
higher.
Substituting now in equation (19) the values of eJ
t = (1−γJ)τJyJ
t found
in Proposition 1 for the diﬀerent regimes J = N,P,R, dating the same

















Under all political regimes J = N,P,R, when αJ
t+1 are in steady-states
αJ
v, inequality evolves with economic growth. In particular, inequality in-
creases if the economy is growing; it stays constant if the economy is at the
steady-state of average income yJ
s; it decrease if the economic growth rate
is negative. Before the αJ′
t+1s have reached their respective steady-states
αJ
v, growth and inequality may move in opposite directions depending on
whether the initial condition α0 is greater or lower than the steady states
αJ














25Thus, in our model education and inequality are positively related (more education
reduces the mismatch, thus increasing inequality). Notice that the relation between ed-
ucation and inequality is not uncontroversial. An opposite, negative relation is found by
Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) and Hassler, Rodriguez Mora and Zeira (2006), due to the
fact that public education increases the number of skilled workers and reduces the number
of unskilled (see also Tamura 1991). However, Hassler, Rodriguez Mora and Zeira (2006)
also argue that more public education requires higher taxes. Skilled parents pay higher
taxes, but they may also beneﬁt more from education than unskilled parents, because
they use education better (on the diﬀerent returns from education see also Connolly and
Gottschalk 2006). Thus, they may prefer more public education than unskilled parents.
In this case, more public education may even increase inequality.





is because the two variables will typically reach the steady-state at diﬀerent times. (In
20of the relationships between growth and pre-tax inequality for the case of
decreasing returns.
Notice also that the fact that αJ′
t+1s converge under all regimes to their
steady-states, does not imply that in the long-run the impact of αJ′
t+1s is
irrelevant for inequality. On the contrary, given that a higher αJ
t+1 directly
increases inequality for generation t+1, which evolves according to equation








at all t = 0,1,2,.... Thus, we can unambiguously
compare inequality under the diﬀerent political regimes.
Proposition 4 Given initial condition α0 ∈ [0.5,1] and time-invariant ωJ
under the three regimes J = N,P,R, then IP
t+1 > IN
t+1 > IR
t+1 at all t =
0,1,2,....
When the poor are more politically inﬂuent, the economy is characterized
by a higher pre-tax inequality than under a “neutral” political regime, which
in turn shows higher inequality than the regime supported by the rich.
These results deserve some comments. Technically they arise because
both mismatch and economic growth are positively correlated with inequal-
ity, with both growth and inequality being higher in the ﬁrst political regime
(poor), followed by the second (neutral) and then by the third (rich). That
higher mismatch is associated with more pre-tax inequality is (as it has been
noted) intuitive. The relationship between growth and inequality is, on the
other hand, one of the most debated in the literature27. In this paper, the
nature of this relationship is based on the idea that a higher public educa-
tion on one side increases growth by increasing the level of human capital,
while on the other side it better shapes diﬀerences in human capitals due
to talent, thus increasing pre-tax inequality. For the reason related to the
mismatch, the political regime supported by the poor is the most inclined
to public education, which induces more growth and more pre-tax inequal-
ity. At the same time, together with the “neutral” regime, the regime of
the “poor” is also the most favorable of redistribution; so under the regimes
addition, while the steady-state of α
J
t+1 will always be reached and under all regimes —
see Proposition 3 —, the steady-state of the average income y
J
t+1’s may well fail to exist
or to be reached under diﬀerent conditions — see Section 4.1).
27In particular, in the ninenties various theories of endogenous growth, stimulated by
the renewed interest in the Kuznets’ curve, have theorized a negative relationship between
inequality and growth. As however recently put by Forbes (2000), “a careful reading of
this literaure indicates that such negative relationship is far less deﬁnitive than generally
believed” (p. 869). In addition, while on the empirical side “the Kuznets curve — whereby
inequality ﬁrst increases and then decreases during the process of economic development
— emerges as a clear empirical regularity... this relation does not explain the bulk of
variations in inequality across countries or over time” (Barro 2000, p. 29). See also
Perotti (1996) for a classical reference on the political economy literature of growth and
inequality.
21Figure 4: Interaction between inequality and growth (example of decreas-
ing returns)
a) ωN = 1




















































c) ωR < 1

























22run by the poor, there is both maximum pre-tax inequality and minimum
post-tax inequality28.
4.3 Social mobility
In our two social classes economy, social mobility is simply given by the
probability (1 −   pt+1) of class transition.
Proposition 5 . Under all regimes j = N,P,R, social mobility is given by:
(1 −   pJ
t+1) = 1 − c + d(1 − γJ
t )τJ
t (21)
For a time-invariant ωJ under each regime, the corresponding   pJ
t+1 is time-
invariant with   pR
t+1 >   pN
t+1 >   pP
t+1.
As expected, social mobility is the highest when the poor are more polit-
ically inﬂuent; it reaches an intermediate value when rich and poor have the
same political inﬂuence; and it is lowest when the rich are more politically
inﬂuent. Social mobility is in fact good for the poor (upward mobility),
while it is bad for the rich (downward mobility).
5 The cost of the mismatch
An implication of the results of the previous section is that a society with
less mismatch is associated with more education, which induces more human
capital and growth. The mismatch of talents, however, may also imply an
eﬃcient cost in production, which directly reduces growth. Though clearly
expressed by Plato (see in particular the quotation at the top of the paper),
this eﬀect has not been enough emphasized by the economic literature29.
28A similar result is obtained by Saint-Paul and Verdier (1993) in a median voter model
where people vote only on public education as redistributive program.
29Only recently some papers have addressed similar issues, but in rather diﬀerent ap-
proaches. For example, Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1991) study the implications for
growth of the allocation of talent when individuals may choose between occupations
(entrepreneurs or rent-seeking). Similarly, Galor and Tsiddon (1997) and Hassler and
Rodriguez Mora (2000) show that when individuals have more returns from becoming
entrepreneurs (due, for instance, to technological changes), intelligence is more important
than social backgrounds for the allocation of individuals, and thus a more eﬃcient alloca-
tion emerges, which is associated with a higher growth. In a similar line, Gennaioli and
Caselli (2005) also show that failures of meritocracy, such as dynastic management, may
reduce growth. Maoz and Moav (1999) focus on liquidity constraints. They demonstrate
that in societies in which education is privately acquired, liquidity constraints may prevent
high talented people of poor families to access higher education, with a loss of eﬃciency.
In most of the above studies, however, the misallocation of resources is before investing in
human capitals, while in our model it occurs also after the ﬁnancing of public education.
Its costs may therefore be relatively higher, as we explain in this section.
23We illustrate this point in a simple model. We assume that individuals’
human capitals, rather than determining directly their productivity, are per-
fect complement in the production process. Though this hypothesis would
seem speciﬁc, it clariﬁes a general point. Suppose that there is a single in-
dustry employing all workers and producing all GDP using a basic Leontieﬀ
technology, which can be reproduced as many times one wishes. That is,
pairing any two workers l and f of generation t+1, the technology produces
an homogenous output qt+1,lf according to the production function:
qt+1,lf = 2Min{ht+1,l;ht+1,f} (22)
where ht+1,l and ht+1,f are the human capitals of the two workers. Clearly,









t AH, it follows that any pair of workers










t AH, when both workers have high talent.
Thus, if society wishes to obtain the maximum overall output from all
workers, it would be necessary to pair all individuals with low talent on one
side, and all individuals with high talent on the other side. If society could
recognize people’s talent without any mistake, social classes could be formed








t AL and income of people with high talent







t AH. These would also be
the incomes of the poor and of the rich, respectively, in a society in which
people ’s productivity is given by their human capital and all individuals
are put in the correct social class.
Suppose, however, that some mismatch of the form described in Section
2.4 occurs when forming the social classes30. Thus, a fraction αt+1 of workers
with hL
t+1 and a fraction (1 − αt+1) of workers with hH
t+1 enter the group
of people “recognized” with low talent, while symmetric proportions enter
the group of people “recognized” with high talent. By applying the Hardy-
Weinberg Principle of the allele frequencies we then have that31: i) among
30To be more consistent with the idea of the mismatch illustrated in Section 2.4, one
should in fact add a random eﬀect to the Leontieﬀ production technology (22) (similar
indeed to that assumed in equation (4) of footnote 7), justifying the hypothesis of imperfect
information, namely that individuals’ talents cannot be observed either directly, through
inspection of human capitals, or even indirectly through the individuals’ productivity.
31In its simplest form used here, the Hardy-Weinberg Principle of population genetics
implies that randomly pairing all workers from a set containing a proportion q of workers
with human capitals h
L
t+1 and a proportion (1 − q) of workers with human capital h
H
t+1,














t+1) is (1 − q)
2. By deﬁnining q and (1 − q) in terms of αt+1 according to the
prorportions speciﬁed for the two social classes (and applying the Leontieﬀ production
function to the various pairs), one obtains the results given in text.
24the people recognized with low talent , namely the “poor”, there are (1−(1−









t AH; while ii) among the people recognized with high talent,
namely the “rich”, there are α2











Individual incomes for people of each class, which we take to correspond
to the average levels of output produced by all people of the same class, are
then given for the “poor” and the “rich” by, respectively:
yP
t+1 = (1 − (1 − αt+1)2)e
ξ
tHδ


















t [(1 + 2αt+1 − 2α2
t+1)AL + (1 − 2αt+1 + 2α2
t+1)AH] (25)
Thus, in this new setting, per-capita income depends on the extent of the
mismatch αt+1. In fact, since
∂yt+1
∂αt+1 > 0 (when αt+1 ∈ [0.5,1]), the greater
is the mismatch, the lower is average output.
The mismatch generates here a loss of output because, when workers with
high talent are paired with workers with low talent, the higher productivity
of the former is constrained by the lower productivity of the latter, due to the
Leontieﬀ technology. The Leontieﬀ technology however is only an example
for the general problem caused by the mismatch when the productivity of
an individual does not depend only on the individual’s human capital, but
also on the use that the society is able to make of such human capital.
To this respect, the Leontieﬀ example provides also a simple setting to
analyze the cost of the mismatch in terms of the waste of human capital
it generates. To see this, ﬁrst of all notice that the new setting has not
aﬀected the way in which human capitals in society are formed, so that




t [AL + AH]. Substituting in equation (25), we obtain the
following relationship between current average income and current human















if and only if αJ
t+1 = 1; whereas (since
∂yt+1
∂αt+1 > 0, for αJ
t+1 ∈ [0.5,1]) the
lower is αJ
t+1, the lower is yJ
t+1 relative to H
J
t+1.
Moreover, we can compare the dynamics of the average human capi-
tal and the average income to see how the waste of human capital evolves
25in a society with costly mismatch. First, after simple manipulations, the
dynamics equation of the average income can be written as:
yJ
t+1 = BJ(yJ





where BJ′s are under all regimes the same as in economies without costly
mismatch (see Proposition 2)32. Thus, when αJ
t+1 have reached their values
of steady-state αJ
v, the conditions under the three political regimes for the
economies to be growing, for existence of steady-state incomes yJ
s’s and for
characterizing the relationships amongst steady-states and long-run growth
rates are here the same as in the economy without costly mismatch. Namely,
they only depend on the sum δ + ξ33.
Moreover, since we also know that in an economy without costly mis-
match it is yJ
t = H
J
t at all t, the distance between average income and
average human capital in an economy with costly mismatch increases, stays
constant or decreases, depending on whether the economy is growing, is in
steady-state, or it is contracting34. Fig. 5 illustrates the point with three
examples: a) decreasing returns (in the formation of human capital) with
the economy growing to the steady-state; b) decreasing returns with the
economy contracting to the steady-state; and c) constant returns with the
waste of human capital increasing over time.
Finally, it is worthwhile noticing that, although from a qualitative per-
spective the above arguments hold equally true in all political regimes, they
nevertheless apply more strongly depending on the extent of the mismatch
carried by αJ
t+1 under the three regimes. Thus, since we already know from
Proposition 3 that αP
t+1 > αN
t+1 > αR
t+1 at all t, it follows that the arguments
of the costly mismatch reinforce the conclusions of the previous section, that
regimes supported by the poor are better for growth than neutral regimes,
which in turn are better than regimes favored by the rich35.

































t ) dated one period backwards one obtains equation (27).
33This clealry depends on the Leontieﬀ production function with constant returns. But
again the point is more general and it can be easily accomodated for production functions
with increasing or decreasing returns.
34This in particular applies when α
J





yet in steady-states, growth in the economies with and without costly mismatch may for
sometimes be uncoordinated (that is, one economy may be growing while the other is
contracting, and viceversa) depending on whether the initial condition α0 is greater or
lower than the steady states α
J
v of the diﬀerent political regimes (see also Fig. 5).
35A similar discussion holds regarding inequality. In particular, inequality is now given
26Figure 5: Economic dynamics when mismatch is costly
























We have presented a political economy model in which the two social classes
of rich and poor compete over redistribution and public education policies.
Our model emphasizes crucial eﬀects of public education. Firstly, as it is
standard in the economic literature, education increases economic growth,
which is positive for the all society. Secondly, and this is the more original
contribution of the paper, education aﬀects the mismatch between talents
and social classes. In particular, education reduces the probability that
individuals with low talent but coming from rich families are placed in jobs
which should be reserved to people with high talent (and viceversa). Thus,
education promotes equality of opportunity. The political behaviours of both
social classes are then driven by strategic incentives, mainly for the poor to
increase public education at the expense of pure redistribution in order to





















t (AH − AL) + 2AL









t is in steady-state, since all factors containing α
J
t are equal to 1, inequality
evolves with economic growth as in the economy without costly mismatch, but with the
diﬀerent growth rates resulting from the eﬀect of the mismatch. (When α
J′
t ’s are not yet
in steady-states, the dynamics may be a bit more complex due the interaction between
the two factors containing α
J
t at diﬀerent t).
27avoid downward mobility. As a consequence, the equilibrium depends on
which social class is more politically inﬂuent.
As any theoretical model, our model represents a simpliﬁcation of the
reality. First of all, in our setting there is only public education. This
was to emphasize the impact of public education on mobility independently
from considerations related to imperfections of capital markets as in most
of the previous literature (see, e.g. Checchi 2006, and references therein).
When private education is possible, our model can however be extended.
In particular, with private education any dollar spent by poor parents and
by rich parents for the education of their kids would aﬀect diﬀerently the
mismatch of talent and social mobility: namely, the dollars spent by poor
fathers would increase mobility and reduce the talents mismatch, while the
opposite would be true for the dollars spent by rich fathers. Other interest-
ing implications of the social conﬂict over mobility may then emerge. For
example, when private education is possible, redistribution could represent
for the poor a way alternative to capital markets to buy private education
for their kids. As a consequence, for low level of redistribution, the rich may
prefer a system with only private education, while for high level of redistri-
bution they may prefer one with only public education in order to stop the
poor buying privately even more education to increase exchange mobility.
Another simpliﬁcation of the present model is that all individuals of the
same class have identical beliefs on their kids’ prospect of mobility. Intro-
ducing diﬀerent beliefs would not change the ﬂavor of our results, though
delivering further interesting possibilities36. If, for instance, we allow a
fraction of poor individuals to believe that their kids have high talent and
another fraction that theirs have low talent, the former fraction will prefer
more education than the second one. As a consequence, even in a pure
system of public education, a majoritarian coalition of rich and poor indi-
viduals believing in the low talent of their kids may emerge, which could
endorse a political equilibrium with more redistribution and less education
and taxation than the one that we obtain in our model when the poor are
more politically inﬂuent37. However, even in this case, the latent conﬂict
between the two social classes on mobility would not disappear, with the
ﬁnal outcome depending on the fractions of poor agents having diﬀerent
beliefs of upward mobility.
Other more technical extensions could also be considered, like the eﬀect
of distortionary taxation, or of endogenous labor supply. But, ultimately,
as in any theoretical abstraction, the strength of the present model depends
on its ability to capture stylized facts of the real world. To this respect
36See Piketty (1995) and B´ enabou and Ok (2001), as seminal theoretical papers on the
various factors which may inﬂuence people beliefs of mobility; see Fong (2001) and Alesina
and La Ferrara (2005), for empirical studies.
37Such extension could in particular be conducted along the theoretical model of Levy
(2005), where individuals diﬀer within the class of the poor according to their age.
28we emphasize that the mismatch between talents and allocation of people
in social classes is a quite clear implication of any society which lacks of
equality of opportunity. Any realistic economic model of education and
social mobility should include a mismatch mechanism. However, despite a
very large literature reasoning informally on the topic, we are not aware
of previous contributions detailing the precise mechanism through which
the mismatch can occur (as in particular in Fig. 1 and Sections 2.4). An
advantage of our speciﬁcation is also that mismatch is modelled in a quite
general setting, which could be generalized to include, further to education,
other factors or public policies (like health, security, liberalization policies)
possibly aﬀecting the talents mismatch and mobility.
Our model provides material for new empirical investigations. In par-
ticular, there are not many studies comparing pure redistributive programs
versus public education across countries38. The present paper oﬀers a frame-
work to study the eﬀect of political inﬂuence. Speciﬁcally, is there any evi-
dence that right-oriented governments (more likely to be supported by the
rich) become increasingly more hostile to public education spending, while
softer on pure redistributive policies, the greater is the degree of openness
in society (a lower value of parameter c in the present paper) and the higher
the eﬀect of education on mobility (a higher parameter d)? Also, is it true
that more politically “neutral” governments spend more on redistribution
and less on education than more left-oriented governments, even when they
impose similar overall levels of taxation?
Of speciﬁc empirical interest could also be the relationships between mo-
bility, talents mismatch and economic growth, in particular the results of
Section 5, on the growing waste of social capital generated by the mismatch
when people with low talent are allocated in jobs of higher potential pro-
ductivity. This may for example be important to explain the recent poorer
performance of some well-developed countries relative to others, which ap-
pear indeed characterized by high levels of redistribution and low levels of
mobility (like notably Italy; Checchi, Ichino and Rustichini 1999).
More generally, various recent studies have emphasized a trade-oﬀ be-
tween mobility and redistribution, noting that the political support for re-
distribution tends to be lower in societies where social mobility is higher (see
e.g. B´ enabou and Ok 2001, and Alesina and La Ferrara 2005). These stud-
ies, however, have generally treated mobility as exogenous to the political
process. It may be interesting to verify to what extent the idea of a social
conﬂict over mobility can explain more general diﬀerences (regarding public
education, but possibly also other public policies) of welfare models across
38Among the few studies, Lindert (1996) compares welfare transfers programs and public
education expenditures across OECD countries over the period 1960-1981. He focuses
especially on the eﬀect of the size of cohorts of diﬀerent age. It is therefore more relevant
to study the intergenerational conﬂict on the demand of public education (Levy 2005),
rather than the political conﬂict.
29countries and their implications for growth and mobility (as for example
recently reviewed in Solon 2002).
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
The ﬁrst order conditions for the maximization problem are:



















− d(1 − γt)(1 − ω)
 
lnAH − lnAL 












+ dτt(1 − ω)
 
lnAH − lnAL 
All variables are indexed at time t. Thus, we henceforth suppress the
index t. Notice that SOCτ < 0 and SOCγ < 0, for all γ and τ. Notice
also that the solution of the maximization problem can be of three types: i)
τ = 1 and γ ∈ (0,1), ii) γ = 0 and τ ∈ (0,1), iii) τ ∈ (0,1) and γ ∈ (0,1).
• Case ω ≥ 1.















ξ − d(1 − γ)(1 − ω)
 



















[(1 − τ)yP + γτy]2 +
ωyRy
[(1 − τ)yR + γτy]2 > 0
and that ξ(τ,γ,w) > 0 (since ω > 1, and AH > AL).
We proceed in four steps. In step 1) we show that for γ = 1 and ω = 1,
τ solving for C(τ,1,1) = 0 is τ = 1; in step 2) we prove that for any ω > 1
and any γ∗ satisfying FOCγ = 0 (equation 29), then
C(τ,γ∗,ω) + ξ(τ,γ∗,ω) > C(τ,1,1) (30)
In step 3) we show that given condition (30), if an equilibrium exists when
ω > 1, then it is given by the pair (τ = 1,γ = γ∗); in step 4), we show that
such an equilibrium exists and is unique; in particular, we show that when
τ is optimally chosen to be equal 1, then there is a unique γ∗ internal to the
interval (0,1) both when ω = 1 and when ω > 1; and it is γ∗ = 1
1+ξ when
ω = 1, and 0 < γ∗ < 1
1+ξ when ω > 1.










(1 − τ)yR + τy
0.5
 
yR + yP 




yR + yP 
(1 − τ)yR + τ0.5(yR + yP)
Thus, it is C(τ,1,1) = 0 if and only if τ = 1.
Step 2. To prove condition (30) notice that for γ∗ solving FOCγ (equa-
tion 29), it must be:
ωy(1 − γ∗)
(1 − τ)yP + γ∗τy
+
y(1 − γ∗)
(1 − τ)y + γ∗τy
= ξ(τ,γ∗,ω) (31)
Also notice that C(τ,γ∗,ω)+ξ(τ,γ∗,ω) is the right-hand side of FOCτ
(equation 28) when γ∗ solves FOCγ. Hence, substituting from equation
(31), FOCτ can be written as:
C(τ,γ∗,ω) + ξ(τ,γ∗,ω) = C(τ,γ∗,ω) +
ωy(1 − γ∗)
(1 − τ)yP + γ∗τy
+
y(1 − γ∗)











(1 − τ)yR + γ∗τy
+
ωy(1 − γ∗)
(1 − τ)yP + γ∗τy
+
y(1 − γ∗)











(1 − τ)yR + γ∗τy
With such substitution, condition (30) can then be written as:
ω0.5
 
yR + yP 




yR + yP 




yR + yP 




yR + yP 
(1 − τ)yR + τy
which is always satisﬁed when ω > 1, γ∗ ∈ (0,1), and yP < yR.
Step 3. Step 3 is straightforward. In particular, given: a) that C(τ,γ,ω)
is decreasing in τ and increasing in γ, b) that ξ(τ,γ,w) > 0 (when ω > 1),
c) that τ solving C(τ,1,1) = 0 is τ = 1, d) that condition (30) C(τ,γ∗,ω)+
ξ(τ,γ∗,ω) > C(τ,1,1) holds, and e) that C(τ,γ∗,ω)+ξ(τ,γ∗,ω) is the right-
hand side of FOCτ when γ∗ solves for FOCγ = 0, then it follows that when
the optimal γ is internal, then the optimal tax rate τ∗ = 1.
Step 4. With step 3 we have shown that if there is a γ∗ ∈ (0,1) solving
for FOCγ = 0 when ω > 1, then the corresponding optimal τ∗ = 1. We now
show that such a γ∗ exists and is unique in the interval (0,1). In doing this
we also show that a γ = 0 with a τ solving FOCτ = 0 in the interval (0,1)
doesn’t exist. This implies that the unique political equilibrium when ω > 1
is indeed of type (τ∗ = 1,γ∗ ∈ (0,1)). Next we compute the equilibrium
35γ∗ when ω = 1, obtaining γ∗ = 1
1+ξ; and show that 1
1+ξ is larger than the
equilibrium γ∗ for ω > 1.
To prove existence and uniqueness of γ∗ in the interval (0,1), ﬁrst of
all notice that limγ→1 FOC(γ) = −∞. Together with the assumption that
SOCγ holds (hence
∂FOCγ
∂γ < 0), it follows that for the existence and unique-
ness of γ∗ ∈ (0,1), it is suﬃcient to show that FOCγ(τ = 1,γ = 0) > 0.
The latter is always true since:
FOCγ(γ = 0) :
ωτy
(1 − τ)yP +
τy
(1 − τ)yR−(ω + 1)ξ+dτ(1−ω)
 
lnAH − lnAL 
so that limτ→1 FOCγ(γ = 0) = +∞. More generally, we now prove that
FOCγ(γ = 0) > 0 also for any τ ∈ (0,1) chosen so as to satisfy FOCτ = 0.
Since
∂FOC(γ)
∂γ < 0 always, this excludes the possibility of an optimum when
γ = 0 and τ internal in the interval (0,1). When γ = 0 and τ internal, from
equation (28) we have:
FOCτ(γ = 0) :
−τ(ω + 1)
(1 − τ)
= −(ω + 1)ξ + dτ(1 − ω)
 
lnAH − lnAL 
Substituting −(ω + 1)ξ + dτ(1 − ω)
 
lnAH − lnAL 
in FOCγ and im-
posing γ = 0, one obtains the FOCγ(γ = 0) with τ chosen so as to satisfy















ω0.5(yP + yR)yR + 0.5(yP + yR)yR









yR − (ω + 1)
 
(32)















> 0 if either
yR




= 0 if either
yR












ω applies to the present situation (since yR > yP and
ω ≥ 1) which then excludes the possibility of a solution with γ = 0 and
τ internal when ω ≥ 1. We now compute the equilibrium value of γ when
ω = 1 and τ∗ = 1, and then show that it is greater than the equilibrium







36Notice now that for γ = 1
1+ξ, then G(ω,γ) = 0 all ω. Hence, since G(ω =
1,γ) = FOCγ(ω = 1,τ = 1,γ), it follows that for ω = 1 the equilibrium is
given by the pair (τ = 1,γ = 1
1+ξ). For ω > 1 and τ = 1, FOCγ(ω > 1,τ =
1,γ) is:
FOCγ(ω > 1,τ = 1,γ) = G(ω,γ) + (1 − ω)S (34)
where S = d
 
lnAH − lnAL 
. Since
∂FOCγ
∂γ is always negative and (1−ω)S <
0, it follows that γ solving for FOCγ(ω > 1,τ = 1) = 0 is strictly lower than
γ = 1
1+ξ (which solves for FOCγ(ω = 1,τ = 1) = 0). The actual value of γ




  [(ω + 1)(1 + ξ) − S(1 − ω) (35)
−
 
((ω + 1)(1 + ξ) − S(1 − ω))2 + 4S(1 − ω)(ω + 1)]
(Equation (35) has also been used to draw the graphs of τγ and τ(1−γ)
in Fig. 2 when ω > 1, since in this case τ = 1).
• Case ω < 1.
Firstly we show that there isn’t a solution with τ = 1 when ω < 1. This
follows by noting that when τ = 1, then a solution can only exist with γ
internal. This requires ﬁnding a   γ which solves FOCγ(τ = 1). Then, it
is possible to show that for such a   γ (and ω < 1), it is always FOCτ(τ =
1,γ =   γ) < 0. Hence, since limτ→0 FOCτ = +∞ for any γ ∈ (0,1) and since
SOCτ holds, it follows that a solution with   γ internal and τ = 1 cannot hold
when ω < 1.
Hence, a solution when ω < 1 always requires FOCτ satisﬁed with
equality and τ internal. Reconsider then FOCγ and also recall the ex-





∂γ < 0 and limγ→1 FOCγ = −∞, the inequalities in (33) point
out the conditions when the optimal γ for τ internal can be of two types:
either i) γ = 0, in particular applying when FOCγ|γ=0,τ internal < 0,
hence ω <
yP
yR (see inequalities in 33); or ii) γ ∈ (0,1), applying when
FOCγ|γ=0,τ internal > 0, then
yP
yR < ω < 1. We now separate the analysis in
sub-case i) and sub-case ii).
Sub-case i). When ω <
yP
yR, the political equilibrium is characterized
by τ internal and γ = 0. The actual value of τ solving the problem can be










lnAH − lnAL 
(1 − ω) = 0
37When d = 0, τ =
ξ
1+ξ; on the other hand, given that ∂FOCτ
∂τ < 0, when
d > 0 the optimal τ is lower than
ξ




  [(ω + 1)(1 + ξ) + S(1 − ω) (36)
−
 
((ω + 1)(1 + ξ) + S(1 − ω))2 − 4S(1 − ω)(ω + 1)ξ]
where S = d
 
lnAH − lnAL 
. (Since in this sub-case γ = 0, equation 36 has





yR < ω < 1, the equilibrium is with both γ and τ






(1 − τ)yP + γτy
+
τ(−yR + γy)
(1 − τ)yR + γτy
= −(ω + 1)ξ (37)
+d(1 − γ)τ(1 − ω)
 
lnAH − lnAL 
FOCγ : −
(1 − γ)ωτy
(1 − τ)yP + γτy
−
(1 − γ)τy
(1 − τ)yP + γτy
= −(ω + 1)ξ (38)
+d(1 − γ)τ(1 − ω)
 






(1 − τ)yP + γτy
+
τ(−yR + γy)
(1 − τ)yR + γτy
= −
(1 − γ)ωτy
(1 − τ)yP + γτy
−
(1 − γ)τy
(1 − τ)yP + γτy
and after few manipulations:
ω
(1 − τ)yP + γτy
=
1
(1 − τ)yR + γτy
Substituting in FOCτ and FOCγ, one obtains:
τγ =
(1 − τ)   (ωyR − yP)
y(1 − ω)
(39)
τ(1 − γ) =
ξ2y
2y(1 + ξ) + S(1 − τ)(yR − yP)
(40)
(where S = d
 
lnAH − lnAL 
) .
Expressions (39) and (40) can be studied as functions of the optimal τ
and of the other parameters. In particular, after few more manipulations
one obtains a quadratic equation for τ :
h(τ) = −τ2S(yR − yP)20.5(ω + 1)
+τ[(yR − yP)[(1 + ξ)y(1 + ω) + S((y(1 − ω) + 2(ωyR − yP))]]
−ξy(ω + 1)(yR − yP) − (ωyR − yP)(2y + S(yR − yP))
Regarding this function we note the following:
381. h(0) < 0 and h(1) > 0: hence the function has a single root (the
optimal τ∗) in the interval τ ∈ (0,1); in addition, at τ∗, ∂h(τ∗)/∂τ > 0.
2. Further, it is possible to show that at τ∗: ∂h(τ∗)/∂ω < 0, ∂h(τ∗)/∂d >
0, and ∂h(τ∗)/∂ξ < 0. Since h( ) is increasing at τ∗, the signs of the
above derivatives imply, in the order, that: ∂τ∗/∂ω > 0, ∂τ∗/∂d < 0,
and ∂τ∗/∂ξ > 0.
































y(1−ω) ] > 0
which are used to draw the solid lines in Fig. 2 when
yP
yR < ω < 1 (and
d > 0).
Alternatively, the same predictions can be obtained studying the explicit
forms for τγ and τ(1 − γ), which can also be obtained from equations (39)
and (40). In particular, after few manipulations, one can obtain the following
quadratic equations for τγ and τ(1 − γ), respectively:
0 = −(τγ)2S(1 − ω)(yR − yP)[(ωyR − yP) + (1 − ω)y]
−τγ(ωyR − yP)(yR − yP)[(1 + ξ)(ω + 1) − S(1 − ω)]
+2(ωyR − yP)2 (41)
0 = (τ(1 − γ))
2 S(1 − ω) − τ(1 − γ)[(1 + ξ)(1 + ω) + S(1 − ω)]
+ξ(1 + ω) (42)
Regarding the latter equation for τ(1 − γ) also notice that since it does
not depend on the pair (yR,yP), but only on the parameters, it is time-
invariant. (Indeed, equation 42 delivers for τ(1 − γ) the same root as both
equation 35 — holding when the optimal solution is with τ = 1—, and
equation 36 — holding when in the optimal solution γ = 0). Finally, also
notice that when d = 0 (hence S = 0), equations (41) and (42) give:
τγ =
2(ωyR − yP)
2(ωyR − yP) + (ω + 1)ξ(yR − yP) + (yR + yP)(1 − ω)
τ(1 − γ) =
ξ
1 + ξ
which are used to draw the dotted lines in Fig. 2.
39Proof of Proposition 2.
Substitute from Proposition 1 the political equilibrium values of eJ
t in equa-





t so that yN
t+1 = 0.5(AL + AH)(
ξ
1+ξ)ξ(yN
t )ξ+δ, and BN =
0.5(AL + AH)(
ξ
1+ξ)ξ in equation (18). Similar substitutions when ωP > 1
and ωR < 1 imply BP > BN > BR. The rest of the Proposition follows
from basic properties of diﬀerence equations. (See also Fig. 3).
Proof of Proposition 3
Substitute for the generic time-invariant et






=(1 − γJ)τJ derived from Proposition 1 under regimes
J = N,P,R.
Proof of Proposition 4
Directly from: i) Proposition 2 showing that, under all possible combinations




















t+1 at all t = 1,2,....; iii) equation (20) for the evolution of
IJ
t+1.
Proof of Proposition 5
From Equation (12) and Proposition (1).
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